A universal access control method based on host identifiers for Future Internet  by Wang, Hongchao et al.
Computers and Mathematics with Applications 60 (2010) 176–186
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Computers and Mathematics with Applications
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/camwa
A universal access control method based on host identifiers for
Future Internet
Hongchao Wang a, Hongke Zhang a, Chi-Yuan Chang b, Han-Chieh Chao b,c,∗
a National Engineering Laboratory for Next Generation Internet Interconnection Devices, Beijing Jiaotong University, 100044, Beijing, China
b Department of Electrical Engineering, National Dong Hwa University, Hualien, Taiwan
c Institute of Computer Science & Information Engineering and Department of Electronic Engineering, National Ilan University, I-Lan, Taiwan







a b s t r a c t
There have been many security events in the Internet. Many of them are due to arbitrary
access permissions to the network resources of the malicious users, especially their free
sending packets to anywhere in the network. However, current existing solutions such as
ingress filtering and network firewalls cannot solve the problem of malicious access to
the network flexibly and effectively. In this paper, we present an efficient access control
methodbased onhost identifiers, inwhich a safe andbidirectional authentication process is
introducedwhenever the host begins to access the network. Meanwhile, all the succeeding
information exchanges between the host and the network can be controlled through the
encrypt scheme negotiated during the access authentication process. Through analysis
and experiments, we find that the proposed method has the following merits. First, our
method has the capability to support various end-nodes to access the Internet in a uniform
way. Second, with our method, end-nodes and the core network can establish a mutual
trustworthy relationship to avoid any spoof from the other side. Third, our method can
support host mobility very well.
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Access control (AC) is a security mechanism to protect certain resources or services from illegal access. It is an important
component in the security of modern information and communication systems [1]. As for the network, AC is adopted to
control the users who want to access the network and avail the services of the network. It is the first doorsill and plays an
important role in the network security.
At the time the current Internet was designed, network nodes were assumed to be trustful to each other. With the rapid
development of the Internet, however, some network users become threatening andmalicious, as envisioned by the Denial-
of-Services (DoS), spam information, identity spoof, etc.
According to the report [2], there were 1813 incidents received by CNCERT/CC in the first half of 2007. More than 60% of
the incidents could be avoided, if the network had a perfect access control mechanism. Therefore, how to control the large
number of potential malicious users to access the network has become a puzzle requiring urgent solutions.
Although some access control mechanisms [3–5] have been proposed, they are not enough to support security, mobility
and PnP (Plug and Play) applications in Future Internet. Furthermore, the wireless channels are easy to access and the
internet protocols are open to all users. Thismakes it easy for the third party to capture the packets and analyze the contents,
even juggle or clone the data and spoof the opposite side to acquire some important information.
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In Future Internet, both end-nodes and core networks should be protected from spoof or illegal access and a mutual
trustful environment should be set up between them [6]. Moreover, Future Internet should permit various kinds of end-
nodes such as Personal Computer (PC), Personal Digital Assistant (PDA), Mobile Phone (MP), Telephone, and Sensor Node
(SN) to access the network. In other words, the size of Future Internet will be bigger and there will be more malicious users
in Future Internet. Besides, Future Internet should support host mobility in the global scope. However, there is no good
access control method to support various kinds of end-nodes to access the network in a uniformway and control themobile
nodes to access the network flexibly and efficiently in the global scope. Hence, in order to satisfy the requirements of Future
Internet, a new access control mechanism is needed.
The main contribution of this paper is a universal access control method based on host identifiers for Future Internet. In
the view of the network information exchange, the proposed method has the following characteristics. First, it is a network
protocol which can prevent the unregistered or malicious users from accessing and using the network. Meanwhile, it can
limit the speed of users’ sending packets to an appropriate level. Second, it is based on the host identifier which is abstracted
from the hardware information of the host, and it has a universal formation for all the nodes that can access the future
network. Third, the proposedmethod contains a bidirectional authentication processes that can assure amutual trustworthy
environment to be established between the host and the network. At last, the method has a coordination mechanism
between different access points which makes the future network support the host mobility very well.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly presents related work. We present our access control
method in Section 3, followed by the security analysis of the method in Section 4. In Section 5, we present results from
experimental tests. Finally, we outline concludes and future work in Section 6.
2. Related work
Due to the importance of the access control in the network, there have been some researchers to develop the access
control models or new network architectures to make the network be more secure and reliable.
Ingress Filtering [7] is a typical scheme to implement network access control. This method requires Internet Service
Providers and organizations at the edge to apply filters limiting the source addresses allowed on incoming packets to
those specifically allowed in the stub networks. If there were 1/4 of networks not applying Ingress Filtering, the whole
network would still be insecure. In addition, the strict binding of IP, MAC and physic Port will restrict mobility of end-nodes
exceedingly.
Context-based access control schemes [8,9], can partly solve the access control problem flexibly. But they are still one-
way authentication, or they need to take up more memory space or consumemore compute resources. What is more, some
simple sensor nodes in Future Internet are difficult to satisfy the requirements. Kulkarni et al. [10] propose a context-aware
role-based access control model for pervasive computing applications. However, it is directed against the programming
framework.
Forstall et al. [11] point out an access control management scheme based on the profile associate to the media device.
When themedia device is connected to a host computer system, if themedia device has a development profile, the integrated
development environment on the host computer system can access the media device. Otherwise, if the device only has a
personal profile, the integrated development environment is prevented from accessing the device. It is a very well access
control method to protect the copyrights of the software. When the device has the ability to exchange information with
others, its network behavior still cannot be controlled.
IP Security [12–14] can provide authentication and protection in the network layer. However, it needs to spend a
long time on encryption and decryption. It is mainly used to solve the end-to-end security, but it is not fit for secure
network access control. Host Identity Protocol [15] can reduce certain types of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. However,
it emphasizes to solve the mobility and enhance the end-to-end security in communication process, and its performance
could not satisfy the need of mobile node’s fast handoff among different access points.
Bao et al. [16] propose a light-weight encryption schemes formultimedia data and high-speed networks. However, it is an
encrypt/decrypt scheme to protect the data integrity, reliability and availability running the end systems. But, its high-speed
and light-weight encrypt scheme is valuable for our design the access control method in future networks.
In addition, from Secure and Scalable Internet Routing Architecture [17], Locator/ID Separation Protocol [18], which are
the candidates of the Future Internet architecture, we can find that the separation of accessing and routing is the trend. This
mechanism can enhance the security of the core part of the Internet efficiently. But, at the edge of the network, especially
in the access network, there should have a good access control mechanism to provide high security for the whole network.
This paper considers access control in the network layer and proposes a universal access control method based on host
identifiers. In the following sections, the paper presents the specific process of access control and its implementation in the
universal network [19].
3. A universal access control method based on host identifiers
By analyzing and studying the technology of access control in traditional telecommunication and Internet deeply and
systematically, we summarize the commonness of various access control mechanisms and design the Universal Access
Control Method Based on Host Identifiers.
178 H. Wang et al. / Computers and Mathematics with Applications 60 (2010) 176–186
Fig. 1. The universal network model.
Our approach can be separated into two parts: one is the registration process, and the other is the authentication
process. That is to say, if one end-node wants to access the network, it must register its identity information which can
differ itself from others into the Authentication Center, which stores the registered information of every end-node in the
registration process firstly. When an end-node attempts to use the network to communicate with others, it should finish
the authentication process firstly before the communication.
In addition, we design the handover process to support the mobility of end-nodes and encryption process to prevent
the threat of sniffer and clone from the third party in our method. The specifics of all the processes will be described in the
following sections.
3.1. Terms
In order to illustrate our approach clearly, some important terms are given as follows:
• End-nodes: generally refer to the various network terminals that can access the network, for example, PC, Telephone,
MP, and SN.
• Accessing and Switching Router (ASR): responsible for providing the service of network access to end-nodes,
authenticating end-nodes that want to access the network, assigning and maintaining the mapping relations between
the accessing identifiers and the routing identifiers for the end-nodes which have passed the authentication, meanwhile
mapping the identifiers of the packets and forwarding the packets in the network layer.
• Authentication Center (AUC): responsible for recording the information about the accessing identifiers and identity
information of end-nodes, authenticating end-nodes when they try to access the network, and providing some necessary
information about encryption between end-nodes and ASRs.
• Mapping Server: responsible for restoring the mapping relations between AID and RID, and provides the service of
resolving themapping relations between AIDs and RIDs to the ASR, when the ASR has no caches of themapping relations.
It is located in the core networks and works with RIDs as the network identifiers.
• Accessing Identifier (AID): the identity of a host or router located in access networks. It is a network layer identifier. A
host or router in access networks has one or more globally unique AID(s) which will not change under moving.
• Routing Identifier (RID): the locator of a host node. RID is also a network identifier. It is used in the core networks, and
indicates the topological location of the host node in the network. RIDs of a host node are assigned by each accessing and
switching router (ASR) to which the host node attaches.
• Host Identifier (HI): a kind of unreadable information which can indicate a unique end-node. It can be considered as a
kind of host identity.
3.2. Overview of the universal network model
Before the specifics of the proposed access control method, we first introduce the universal network. The universal
network is designed for the Future Internet that allows various kinds of terminals to access in a uniform way. It divides the
whole network into two parts, access network and core network. The access network and the core network are in completely
separated routing spaces. A mapping service is used to bridge them. Its structure and a simple communication process can
be shown as Fig. 1.
As shown, the core network consists of a lot of provider networks (PNs), mapping servers and authentication centers. End
hosts are located at access networks that connect with provider networks through accessing and switching routers (ASRs)
at borders of provider networks. Whenever a source S wants to communicate with a destination D, it must pass the access
authentication process among the source S, ASR and AUC through step (1) and (2) identified in the figure. Of course, the
destination D also needs the network access permission to finish the communication. After the authentication processes,
the ASR11 and ASRk1 will allocate routing identifiers to S and D and register the mapping relations to the mapping server,










Fig. 2. The formation process of host identifier.
respectively. After that, the source S can send its packet to the destination D through forwarding its packet to the ASR11.
Then, ASR11 maps the accessing identifiers include both the source and destination in the packet header to the routing
identifiers by searching its cache or consulting the mapping servers, and forwards the packet to ASRk1 corresponding to the
destination D. The ASRk1 does the similar process with ASR11, just difference from routing identifiers to accessing identifiers,
and forwards the packet to the destination D at last.
The universal networkmodel shows us a basic network architecture. In order to achieve the aim to allow all the potential
terminals to access the future network in a uniform way, a universal access control method should be define to assure the
network security. Therefore, a universal identifier of the host identity can make this aim easy to be achieved.
3.3. Generation of host identifiers
Currently, various types of end-nodes have their own identifiers such as phone number, IP address and user’s identity
when they access the network. It is difficult for us to use them as the basic information of access control in a uniform way,
because it will make the access control system much complex.
Butwe can abstract some commonness from the inherent information of the devices and organize them to formauniform
host identifier. Therefore, we design amethod to generate uniformhost identifiers based on the device inherent information.
In this way, the network system can authenticate all kinds of end-nodes in a uniform way. The formation process of host
identifiers is illustrated by Fig. 2.
In spite of the differences existing among kinds of terminals, there still have some attributes that all the terminals own
andwe can use them as the basis of the access control in the future network. For example, we can class all the terminals into
several types according to the characteristics of mobility, mobile and fixed or the characteristics of functions, voice, video
and data. Therefore, the device type can be considered as a part of the inherent attributes. Just as shown in Fig. 2, using the
device type, device manufactory, serial number and so on, we can determine an only terminal. Based on the assumption, we
can give out the specific generation process of host identifier described as follows:
HI = H (I1 (A1) ‖ I1 (A1) ‖ · · · ‖ In (An)) .
In the above equation, Ai (1 ≤ i ≤ n) denotes the ith attribute of the device inherent information. Due to the existing
differences among various devices, we design Ii (Ai) (1 ≤ i ≤ n) to uniform the format of the ith attribute Ai. Function
H (I1 ‖ I1 ‖ · · · ‖ In) integrates all the formatted attributes into a bunch and generates the Host Identifier by taking a hash
algorithm over the attribute bunch.
In order to learn the generation process of host identifiers easily, we give an example in the following. Now assume that
the device inherent information only includes three types: device type, device manufactory and serial number. Meanwhile
use SHA-1 as the hash function. We have a ‘‘NOKIA’’ mobile phone with serial number 359329022572465. Then we can use
the above equation to form the host identifier:
HI = SHA− 1 ((‘‘Mobile’’) | (‘‘NOKIA’’) | (‘‘359329022572465’’))
= SHA− 1 (‘‘MobileNOKIA359329022572465’’)
= 8cbb408e5217cc77d95049fd862c25c118892e48.
3.4. Registration process
End-nodes must register their identity information into the AUCs before they can access the network. The registration
process of an end-node includes the following four steps.
Step 1: the user of the end-node prepares the host identifier, the key of authentication, and some information about the user
for the registration. Among them, the host identifier can be generated according to Section 3.2. The key of authentication is
used as the main key when the host tries to pass the authentication process. The information about the user can be uses for
account or other purposes.
Step 2: the information prepared in Step 1 should be registered into the server in the authentication center through a secure
mode; of course, it is the best for the user to go to the business office for the registration.
Step 3: according to the information the user has registered, the authentication center assigns an accessing identifier to the
end-node, or the accessing identifier is appointed by the user himself. But anyhow, the accessing identifier should be unique.
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Step 4: the authentication center constructs a binding relation between the accessing identifier and the registered
information, and stores it into the authentication database.
Having completed the registration process, the end-node will be able to try to pass the authentication process described
in the following section and access the network.
3.5. Authentication message type
In the proposed access control method, there are eight types of messages: Request, Reply, Parameter, Query, Result,
Response, Encryption and Indication. The contents and functions of each message can be described as follows:
1. Request Message: The Request message is an initial message that identifies the host start the access authentication
process. Its content contains only a token which is use for the ASR to reply the host. Therefore, the request Message
can be presented as:Mauthreq = {Thost}.
2. ReplyMessage: The ReplyMessage is the responsemessage of the ASR to the Request Message sent by a host. Besides the
token copied from the Request Message, there is another token generated by the ASR, which is assigned a host to finish
the succeeding message interchange. Its formation can be illustrated as:Mauthrep = {T ′host|Tasr}.
3. Parameter Message: The Parameter Message is used to take the basic authentication information of the host to the
network. Thus, its contents include the encrypted host identifier and the assigned token by the ASR. Besides, it contains
the tokens copied from the Reply Message and a challenge that needs to be answered by the AUC in order to trust the
network. The corresponding presentation of the Parameter Message isMauthpar = {Thost|T ′asr|Ekey(HI)| Challenge}.
4. Query Message: The Query Message is adopted to query the AUC whether or not the host is a legal registered host. In
order to differ each host for the ASR, the ASR will generate the Query Message by attaching the AID of the host to the
Parameter Message. Its formation isMauthque = {Thost|T ′asr|Ekey(HI)| Challenge|AIDhost}.
5. ResultMessage: The ResultMessage is used to provide the ASRwith the result of the authentication to the host. It contains
the flag of the authentication result, some other information that may be needed in the following interchange between
the ASR and the host, and the AID of the host. Meanwhile, it includes the network response to the host challenge. It can
be formatted as:Mqureres = {F(Mauthque)|Infoencrpt| Response|AIDhost}.
6. Response Message: The Response Message is used to announce the host the result of the network authentication to the
host and the network response to the host challenge. It can be expressed as:Mauthres = {F(Mauthque)| Response}.
7. Encryption Message: The Encryption Message is used for the host to negotiate the encrypt mode for the usual data
communication. Its formation isMauthenc = {MODEencrypt}.
8. Indication Message: the Indication Message is used to indicate the result of encrypt mode negotiation for the host. It
contains only the negotiated result. Its presentation isMencrind = {MODEencryind}.
Based on the above eight types of messages, the following access authentication process assures the mutual trustworthy
environment between the host and the network is established.
3.6. Authentication process
In order to establish a mutual trustworthy environment, end-nodes must pass the authentication of the network.
Meanwhile, the end-nodes do not consider the network as secure until they receive the correct responses to the challenges
which have been sent out by the end-nodes.
In awhole authenticationprocess, the end-nodes and thenetworkneed to finish the interaction of eight types ofmessages
among three network entities: End-node, ASR and AUC. If the end-node passes the authentication process, the ASRwill form
an item of mapping relation for the end-node. In other words, the ASR will assign a routing identifier for the end-node to
deliver its packets in the core network. Otherwise, there is no routing identifier appointed to the end-node in the ASR.
Therefore, the end-node cannot take the service of network access. Fig. 3 illustrates the authentication process in detail.
In the first interaction between the end-node and the ASR, the main content in the messages of Request and Reply is
random numbers used as tokens by the opposite side. In the following messages, one entity will discard any message which
contains a wrong token.
The identity information of the end-node encapsulated in the Parameter message will be delivered to the network and
wait for the authentication of the network. At the same time, a challenge to the network is included in the Parametermessage
for the sake of validating the security of the network.
On receiving the Parameter message, the ASR first checks the token in the message. If the token is the right one which
the ASR has assigned, the ASR will add the accessing identifier of the end-node to the Parameter message and deliver it to
the authentication center. Otherwise, the ASR will discard the Parameter message.
When the authentication center receives the Querymessage, it will look up the item of accessing identifier characterized
by the Query message in the authentication database; if the corresponding item exists, the information about host identity
contained in theQuerymessagewill be validated. Later, the authentication resultwill be fed back to the ASRwho sent out the
Query message in the Result message including the response to the challenge contained in the Query message. Meanwhile,
some information about the encryption that will be used in the encrypt process will be contained in the Result message, if
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Fig. 3. The whole process of authentication.
the end-node pass the authentication. Otherwise, the Result message will be filled with inexistent accessing identifier or
wrong identity.
After the ASR receives the Result message, it will propagate the authentication result and the response to the challenge
the end-node has sent out in another named Response message to the end-node. In addition, the ASR shall reserve the
encrypt information and assign a routing identifier for the end-node, if the end-node has passed the authentication of the
network.
The last interaction between the end-node and the ASR in the authentication process is used to negotiate about specific
encrypt information, for example, encrypt mode, encrypt key.
In order to control the access of the end-nodes in a near-real-time way, the authentication list needs to be refreshed at
regular intervals, during which the ASR destroys the authentication items that have been inactive for a particular period. On
the other hand, the end-nodes should send an Update message to the ASR in time so that they can use the network without
once more whole authentication process. It is easy to be realized by extending the Encrypt and Indication messages.
3.7. Handover process
Along with the development of the pocket and intelligent end-nodes, the demand that mobile end-nodes need to access
the wireless network has been becoming stronger and stronger. In Future Internet, not only a good scheme of access control
to the end-nodes should be realized, but also the performance of handover latency and the quality of communication when
the end-node moves should be taken account of. Therefore, the access control method should consider the situation when
locomotion and handover of end-nodes occur, and try the best to reduce the adverse effects.
In our approach, we design a diffusion mechanism of authentication list that can provide mobility support of fast
authentication. The working mechanism of the fast authentication process can be described by Fig. 4. With our method,
after the end-node finishes the whole authentication process, it only needs to send the Update messages (extended from
the Encrypt and Indication messages) to the ASR periodically to keep the states of authentication and encryption, even
though the end-node suffers a handover process.
When the authentication item is created, it is added an attribute field which indicates the original ASR of the
corresponding accessing identifier. After the creation of the authentication item, the ASR will distribute the authentication
item to its neighbors. On receiving a Diffusion message of authentication item, the neighbor ASR will modify the attribute
field as foreign. Therefore, when an end-node which has passed the authentication of the network moves into the coverage
of the neighbor ASR, it can continue to use the network just by activating the attribute of the diffusive item. Of course,
we can control the scope of diffusion of the authentication item just by regulating the value of the attribute field when
the item is transmitted. Fig. 5 shows the two different handover scenes of host mobility. In the Fig. 5(a), the host moves
between different ASRs in the same domain. In the scene of Fig. 5(b), the host handover occurs between domains. Both the
two scenes can adopt the diffusion process of the authentication information to support the fast handover of the hosts. Since
all the operations take place before the handover really occurs, the handover latency will not increase. After the network
finishes the diffusion process, the mobile nodes can handover to the new domain.
3.8. Encryption process
Since the wireless channels and some links in the Ethernet are open, anyone can capture the packets that contain the
identity and other information of a legal end-node easily by the sniffer tools, for example, netxray, snoop, sniffit, ethereal,
tcpdump. If there is no measure to deal with the sniffer, when a legal end-node is communicating with others, its identity
information will suffer the threat of interception and clone.
In our approach, we design an encryptionmechanism to solve the problem.When the packet is transmitted between the
end-node and the ASR, it is added a segment of encryption data. This segment ensures that the packet is not a spurious one.
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Fig. 4. Mobility support of fast authentication.
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(a) Intra-domain handover. (b) Inter-domain handover.
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Fig. 6. The processing of encryption.
When the packets that are used to transmit the data of communication with others are received by the end-node from the
ASR or by the ASR from the end-node, the encryption segments of the packets will be checked first. Any packet that consists
a wrong encrypt segment will be discarded.
The information that the encryption process requires is arranged in the Encrypt and Indication messages illustrated in
the authentication process. Besides, the information used to encrypt the packet can be changed by the extended update
messages from the Encryption and Indication messages.
If all the packets use the same encryption segment in the encryption process, it is still insecure. Hence, the encryption
segments of packets should be changedmomentarily. The origin data of the packet should also be adopted as a part of input
of encryption process. Fig. 6 gives out the sketch map of the encryption process.
The selection of the encryption function is also very important, since the complication of the encryption function will
affect the performance of the node. It can be decided according to the grade of security requirement. But we should know a
principle that it is an appropriate encryption function as long as it is securewithin a period that the encryption information is
unchanged. In fact, the encryption information should be available in the next period so as to keep the connection continuous
not to wait the processing of the new encryption information for the end-node.
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4. Security analysis
For any access control scheme, the security issues cannot be neglected. If a scheme itself has the security problem, it will
not be adopted. Because our method is designed in the foundation of the separation between the accessing network and
the core network, the security of the core network can be solved by the separation mechanism [19]. We now analyze the
security of our method in the accessing network with the familiar threat models as follows:
4.1. Identity deception
A secure access control scheme should be set up on the basis of mutual trust between the end-nodes and the networks.
In our approach, there are both the process that end-nodes send their identities to the network for authentication and the
process that the network responds the challenges of the end-nodes. The two processes ensure amutual trustful environment
to be constructed between the end-nodes and the network.
4.2. DoS attack
DoS attack is a commonway of attack. The attackers use the flaws of access equipments or the processing of messages to
send a large number of packets that contain useless information to the access equipments. The access equipments will not
response the legal packets in time because they are busy handling the useless packets.
In order to prevent DoS attacks, we design the tokens that should be carried in the messages of authentication process.
Furthermore, the tokens are checked first in the interactive process and refreshed periodically. Any packet including awrong
token will be discarded; hence the processing of the useless packets will not take up excessive resources of the receiver. In
some sense, this measure reduces the probability of DoS attacks.
4.3. Clone threat
Clone is the identity copy thatwe usually refer to. The attacker usually uses some sniffer tools to acquire the legal identity
of another’s, and uses the legal identity as his own to access the network. This will bring harm to the cloned user. On the
other hand, the attacker may use the identity to defraud the corresponding node of some important information.
In the design of the program, when the end-nodes pass the authentication of the network, they will negotiate about
the encryption issues with the ASR. After that, the exchange between the end-nodes and the ASRs will use the encryption
process for every data packet. Because the third part could not obtain the specific encryption information, the packet sent
out by the cloning user will be dropped at all time. Thereby, the attacker will not be able to achieve his aim of clone.
4.4. Replay attack
Replay attacks refer to that the attackers send the messages that have ever been used by the end-nodes or the ASRs
to defraud the opposite node of the trust. Or, the attackers want to use replay attacks to achieve the aim to make the
corresponding node break down.
In our scheme, we introduce tokens consisting of the rand numbers. Because the token have a certain survival time, only
within the effective survival time of the token included in the message, the messages could be accepted and processed.
4.5. Man-in-the-middle attack
In Man-in-the-middle attacks, the attackers receive and juggle the messages in the way of the transmission, and send
the messages to the real receiver so that the authentication process cannot be rightly operated.
Our method designs an encryption segment which should be formed by the function of the packet and other encryption
information. Because the Man-in-the-middle attackers have no encryption information, the attacker cannot encrypt and
decrypt the packets. Any packet modified by the Man-in-the-middle attackers will be checked out.
5. Experiments
In order to evaluate the functions and performances of our scheme, we make the following experiments in our test-bed
illustrated by Fig. 7, which consists of two domains. In each domain, there are an AUC, a fixed end-node, a mobile end-node,
and one or more ASR(s). The specific performance parameters of the test-bed devices are listed in Table 1.
In the topology, there is a General Switching Router (GSR) which is responsible for the connection of the two domains.
The process of access control is finished among the end-nodes, ASRs and the AUCs.
5.1. Function test
Before the tests, we should register the information of the FN1, MN1 into AUC1 and FN2 MN2 into AUC2. The screenshot
of the MN1’s registration process is displayed in Fig. 8.
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Fig. 7. Topology of experiments.
Table 1
The specific performance parameters of the test-bed devices.
Type CPU RAM NIC
MN 1.6 GHz 256 MB 100 Mb/s
FN 1.7 GHz 1 GB 100 Mb/s
ASR 800 MHz 256 MB 100 Mb/s
GSR 1.8 GHz 512 MB 1000 Mb/s
AUC 2.0 GHz 2 GB 1000 Mb/s
Fig. 8. The registration process of the node MN1.
Table 2
The results of function test.
SREG TEND TASR SRP SHI Rping√ √ √ √ √ √
√ × – – – ×√
– × – – ×√
– – × – ×√
– – – × ×
× – – – – ×
SREG (Registration state)
√
: registered×: not registered.
TEND (Token of end-node)
√
: right×: wrong –: any.
TASR (Token of ASR)
√
: right×: wrong –: any.
SRP (State of response)
√
: right×: wrong –: any.
SHI (State of host identifier)
√
: right×: wrong –: any.
Rping (Result of ping)
√
: pass×: fail.
In the experiment, we divide the test into several cases. We use the command ‘‘ping’’ to test the results of access control.
Table 2 shows the test results in the MN1.
From Table 2, we can see that the functions of our approach can satisfy the requirement of network access control. The
following section gives out the results of performance test.
5.2. Performance test
Authentication latency and the number of end-nodes a scheme can support simultaneously are two important
performance metrics of a scheme, especially when the scheme is used in a large scope network. In the experiment of
performance test, we test the interval of awhole authentication process and the processing performancewith the increasing
number of authentication items.
The test results are described in the Figs. 9 and 10. From Fig. 9, we can see that the cost of a whole authentication process
is distributed from 4 ms to 10 ms with an average of about 6 ms. On the same hardware platform, we have already made
another experiment using HIP [13], which has substantiated that HIP requiredmore than 100ms to finish the base exchange
with 4 messages. Meanwhile, with the increase of the number of authentication items, the average cost gradually increases,
but the growth speed of the average cost is slow, approximately o(log(n)) illustrated by Fig. 10.
H. Wang et al. / Computers and Mathematics with Applications 60 (2010) 176–186 185
Fig. 9. The interval of authentication process.
Fig. 10. The relationship between the processing performance and the number of authentication items.
From Fig. 10, we can see that when the number of authentication items is 5000, the average cost of our scheme is still
below 20ms. Even though there is a longer distance between the ASRs and AUCs or a larger number of authentication items,
the cost of our scheme is still able to satisfy the requirements. Moreover, if the fast authentication is used with only update
message, when an end-node moves, our method can provide lower handover latency. On the contrary, the usual access
control using web authentication needs no less than one second.
6. Conclusion and future work
This paper proposes a Universal Access Control Method Based on Host Identifiers designed for Future Internet. With our
approach, all the kinds of end-nodes can access Future Internet in a uniformway, and a mutual trustful environment can be
constructed between the end-nodes and the networks. In addition, it can solve the problem of identity clone and support
fast handoff very well.
However, there are some issues that are not solved in this paper. As future work, we will consider how to generate
the encryption segment easily and efficiently, how to communicate with the encryption information and research the
optimization methods so as to make our scheme better.
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